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This paper re-examines the role of labor-market competition as a determinant of attitudes 
toward immigration. We claim two main contributions. First, we use more sophisticated 
measures of the degree of exposure to competition from immigrants than previously done. 
Specifically, we focus on the protection derived from investments in job-specific human 
capital and from specialization in communication-intensive jobs, in addition to formal 
education. Second, we explicitly account for the potential endogeneity arising from job 
search. Methodologically, we estimate, by instrumental variables, an econometric model that 
allows for heterogeneity at the individual, regional, and country level. Drawing on the 2004 
European Social Survey, we obtain three main results. First, our estimates show that 
individuals that are currently employed in less exposed jobs are relatively more pro-
immigration. This is true for both our new measures of exposure. Second, we show that the 
protection granted by job-specific human capital is clearly distinct from the protection granted 
by formal education. Yet the positive effect of education on pro-immigration attitudes is 
greatly reduced when we control for the degree of communication intensity of respondents’ 
occupations. Third, OLS estimates are biased in a direction that suggests that natives 
respond to immigration by switching to less exposed jobs. The latter finding provides indirect 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last decade a great deal of research has been devoted to analyzing the economic 
determinants of attitudes toward immigration. Special attention has been paid to testing the 
hypothesis that competition with immigrants in the labor market influences native workers’ 
views.
1 
The  degree  of  competition  between  native  and  immigrant  workers  is  defined  by  their 
relative  skills.  In  most  studies  skills  are  measured  using  education  levels.  Under  the 
assumption that immigrants are, on average, less educated than natives, it is expected that 
low-educated  natives  oppose  immigration  to  avoid  depressing  their  wages.  In  contrast, 
being less exposed to competition from immigrants, highly-educated natives should hold 
less negative views toward (low-educated) immigration and could even be in favor of it, 
depending on the elasticity of the supply of capital. Typically, most studies have found a 
positive association between respondents’ educational attainment and their pro-immigration 
views. This association has been interpreted as evidence that labor-market competition has 
indeed attitudinal effects.  
We find such interpretation wanting for the following two reasons. First, it must be noted 
that the observed relationship between education and attitudes toward immigration does not 
constitute by itself unequivocal evidence in favor of the labor market exposure hypothesis 
since mechanisms other than competition could be driving this association. Sociologists 
and political scientists have long been putting forward alternative interpretations of the 
attitudinal effects of education (see e.g. Jackman and Muha 1981, Bobo and Licari 1989, 
Burns and Gimpel 2000, Kingston et al. 2003). They have argued that the positive effect of 
education on pro-immigration attitudes could be entirely due to values and predispositions 
that  are  associated  to  schooling,  such  as  tolerance,  open-mindedness  or  political 
correctness, rather than to relative scarcity of human capital (see also Wagner and Zick 
1995; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Côté and Erickson 2009).  
                                                        
1 Mayda (2006) provides a useful brief overview of the relevant literature.   2 
Secondly, and most importantly, we believe that defining skills solely in terms of years of 
education  constitutes  a  very  narrow  definition  of  the  human-capital  resources  that 
characterize  native-immigrant  competition  in  the  labor  market  and  hence  provides  an 
incomplete test for the labor-market exposure hypothesis. 
 The main goal of our paper is to provide a re-examination of the role of labor-market 
exposure to competition as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration. The key feature 
in  our  analysis  is  that  we  consider  a  more  comprehensive  definition  of  skills  than 
previously used in the literature. Whilst most studies define skills using educational levels 
only  —typically  distinguishing  between  college-graduates  and  workers  without  tertiary 
education—, we consider two further measures of skills influencing the degree of exposure 
to labor-market competition. These new measures are directly linked to the characteristics 
of the tasks workers perform at their jobs. From an empirical point of view, an attractive 
feature of these measures is their large variation, across jobs and occupations. 
The first new measure of labor-market exposure we consider is job-specific human capital. 
Workers acquire job-specific skills at their firms via formal training, informal instruction or 
learning-by-doing.  Investing  in  job-specific  skills  makes  workers  less  replaceable, 
regardless  of  their  level  of  education  (Becker  1993[1964],  Lazear  1995).  Job-specific 
human capital thus provides protection against competition from other workers, native and 
immigrant alike.  
Our second measure of labor market exposure is motivated by recent work studying how 
native workers respond to recent immigration. Peri and Sparber (2009) show that when 
immigrants  arrive  into  an  economy,  native  workers  mitigate  the  wage  effects  of 
immigration by shifting toward occupations for which they have a comparative advantage. 
Specifically, immigration induces native workers to shun manual jobs and specialize in 
communication-intensive occupations. Natives’ comparative advantage in such occupations 
stems  from  the  possession  of  those  skills  that  immigrants  typically  lack,  in  particular, 
language  and/or  cultural-specific  skills.  We  hypothesize  that  native  workers  in 
communication-intensive  (manual)  occupations  will  be  more  (less)  protected  from   3 
immigrants’ competition and hence will be more (less) likely to display pro-immigration 
attitudes.
2, 3  
By  estimating  directly  the  attitudinal  effects  of  respondents’  general,  job-specific  and 
communicational  skills,  we  attempt  to  cover  all  the  skill  dimensions  of  labor-market 
competition. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper that provides such a comprehensive 
test for the exposure hypothesis. 
Another  attractive  feature  of  our  analysis  is  the  use  of  individual-level  data  for  many 
countries, as in Mayda (2006). Our main data source is the 2004 European Social Survey. 
The immigration module in this dataset has several unique features. It contains detailed 
questions that are highly relevant to understanding individual opinions on immigration. In 
addition, identical questions are posed to all countries included in the survey, allowing for 
high quality cross-country comparisons.
4 For our purposes, another attractive feature of the 
data is that it identifies the respondents’ region of residence within the country. Following 
Autor,  Levy  and  Murnane  (2003)  and  Peri  and  Sparber  (2009),  we  also  use  the  US 
Occupational  Network  Online  Dataset  (O*NET)  to  build  measures  of  the  intensity  of 
interactive (and manual) tasks by occupation. 
Methodologically, we estimate an econometric model that allows for heterogeneity at the 
individual,  regional,  and  country  level.  The  dependent  variable  is  a  measure  of  the 
respondent’s views toward immigration and we consider three dimensions of skills that 
determine these views: formal education, required job-learning time at the current job net of 
education (that is, job-specific human capital) and communication-intensity of the current 
occupation.  Each of these skill variables measures a distinct source of protection from 
immigrant competition in the labor market. We expect lower exposure in each dimension to 








A  further  contribution  of  our  study  is  our  treatment  of  individual  heterogeneity.  Our 
analysis  explicitly  accounts  for  heterogeneity  among  natives  in  their  views  toward 
immigration  and  for  potential  self-selection  into  low-immigration  jobs.  Individual 
observable heterogeneity is addressed by estimating specifications that include a vector of 
controls for ideological and attitudinal variation, whilst self-selection is addressed by using 
an instrumental-variables approach. Specifically, we use the regional availability of low-
exposure jobs as an instrument for actual individual exposure in the current job. To our 
knowledge, building an instrument for individual labor market exposure is novel in the 
literature.
5 
Overall, our results suggest a larger role for labor market competition as a determinant of 
individual  attitudes  toward  immigration  than  previously  found,  as  well  as  a  new 
interpretation for the positive association between education and pro-immigration attitudes. 
More specifically, we report the following three main findings.  
First, the limited role for labor market competition in earlier studies may have been due to a 
combination of poor skill indicators and endogeneity problems. Our estimates suggest that 
individuals with above-average dislike for immigrants tend to work in low-immigration 
jobs, biasing OLS estimates downwardly.  
Second,  our  instrumental-variables  estimates  show  that  individuals  employed  in  less 
exposed jobs are relatively more pro-immigration. This is true for our two new measures of 
exposure. Both the amount of specific human capital required by the job as well as the type 
of skills required in any given occupation play a crucial role in shaping attitudes toward 
immigration. This finding provides indirect evidence in support of the mechanism in Peri 







shift away from jobs and occupations where they face greater competition from immigrant 
workers. 
Third, the positive effect of formal education on pro-immigration attitudes is orthogonal to 
job-specific  human  capital  but  it  is  greatly  reduced  when  we  control  for  the  level  of 
communication-intensive (manual) tasks in the current occupation. This suggests that, to 
some extent, education is a proxy for the type of occupation.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  situates  this  paper  in  the  context  of  the 
previous  literature.  Section  3  presents  the  data  sources,  definitions  of  variables  and 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces our estimation method and explains how we deal 
with endogeneity. The main findings are presented in Section 5. Sensitivity analyses are 
reported in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Previous literature 
Our paper is part of a large and growing body of literature analyzing the determinants of 
attitudes toward immigration. We can classify the work that is more directly related to our 
analysis in three main groups. 
First,  several  authors  have  attempted  to  quantify  the  contribution  of  labor  market 
considerations  relative  to  welfare  state  considerations  and  to  non-economic  factors  in 
explaining  attitudes  toward  immigration.  Using  factor  analysis,  Dustmann  and  Preston 
(2005) analyze the determinants of immigration attitudes using the 2002 European Social 
Survey. With a similar methodology, Dustmann and Preston (2007) use data for Great 
Britain. To identify the role of labor market concerns they employ survey questions on fear 
of job loss, ease of finding a job, and expected future earnings. The results are similar in 
both cases. They find that subjective labor market concerns are a significant determinant of 
attitudes  toward  immigration.  However,  fiscal  considerations  and  cultural  and  racial 
concerns  seem  to  play  a  larger  role.  We  note  that  their  labor  market  variables  are  not 
directly related to exposure to competition from immigrants.    6 
Our paper is also related to a large empirical literature examining the relationship between 
individual education levels and attitudes toward immigration. The common finding across 
all  papers  listed  below  is  that  more  educated  individuals  are  more  pro-immigration,  a 
finding that is typically interpreted as evidence in favor of the labor-market competition 
hypothesis. Among the early studies, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001) use data for the US, while Dustmann and Preston (2001, 2005) study the 
UK.  More  recently,  Mayda  (2006)  and  O'Rourke  and  Sinnott  (2006)  have  employed 
individual-level data covering several (mostly rich) countries. Mayda (2006) shows that 
education is more strongly associated to pro-immigration attitudes in countries with higher 
GDP  per  capita.  She  provides  a  labor-market  interpretation  for  her  finding,  which  is 
consistent with the factors proportion model. O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) find a similar 
result. They also find that non-economic considerations play a larger role than labor market 
concerns.  Facchini  and  Mayda  (2009)  study  empirically  the  joint  relationship  between 
individual  income  and  education  and  attitudes  toward  immigration.  They  find  that  in 
countries with relatively unskilled immigration, individual income is negatively correlated 
with pro-immigration preferences, while education has a positive effect. They propose a 
model with endogenous income redistribution that can rationalize this pattern.
6  
Finally, in addressing endogeneity in the analysis of attitudes toward immigration our paper 
connects to the work of Dustmann and Preston (2001) on the effects of ethnic geographical 
concentration  at  the  local  level.  These  authors  argue  that  the  residential  choices  of 
immigrants (and natives) are likely to depend on unobserved determinants of individual 
attitudes.  They  propose  an  instrumental-variables  approach,  where  county-level  ethnic 
composition is used as an instrument for neighborhood ethnic composition. Controlling for 
endogeneity, they find that higher ethnic residential concentration leads to worse attitudes 
toward  immigration  among  natives.  Their  results  suggest  that  ignoring  the  endogeneity 
problem leads to underestimating this attitudinal effect, since it appears that natives that 




3.  Data 
3.1.  Sources 
Our main data source is the 2004 European Social Survey (ESS). It contains information on 
over 47,000 individuals from 25 countries. All countries with the exception of Luxemburg 
and Iceland are subdivided into regional units (273 regions). Most countries are 3-4% of the 
total sample each, amounting to roughly 1,300 observations each. The mean number of 
observations per region is 76 and the median is 53.
7 Both the cross-country and the cross-
region, within-country variation will be important in our analysis. We restrict our sample to 
currently employed individuals in age bracket 18-64 who are citizens in the respective 
country of residence in 2004. The resulting sample contains over 20,000 individuals. 
We also use data from O*NET, which provides a detailed description of the characteristics 
of each occupation in the US. The O*NET dataset is developed under the sponsorship of 
the  US  Department  of  Labor/Employment  and  Training  Administration.  The  O*NET 
dataset provides very detailed information of the mix of knowledge, skills and abilities 
required,  as  well  as  the  activities  and  tasks  typically  performed,  in  449  different 
occupations. O*NET provides 277 descriptors for each occupation. Each descriptor consists 
of a score ranging from 0 to 1 for each dimension of skill or ability considered. These 
scores are collected by occupation analysts and are constantly updated by ongoing surveys 
of each occupation's worker population and external occupation experts. We use O*NET 
skill descriptors to construct two measures of occupation-specific skills relating to labor-
market competition between natives and immigrants. The first measure is an index of the 
amount of communicational (or interactive) skills required in each occupation, whilst the 
second  measures  the  amount  of  physical  (or  manual)  skills.  These  measures  are 
subsequently matched to European occupational data under the assumption that occupations 
                                                        
7 Appendix 1 contains a list of countries with the number of individual observations per 
country.   8 
across  US  and  European  economies  do  not  differ  in  relation  to  these  two  basic  skill 
dimensions (see below). 
8 
 
3.2.  Definitions 
In line with the existing literature, our dependent variable measures respondents’ desired 
levels of immigration in their countries. The ESS contains three related questions. In each 
question, the respondent is asked whether more immigrants of a particular origin should be 
allowed in the country. There are four possible responses: none, a few, some, or many. The 
three related questions differ on the origin of immigrants: the same race/ethnic group as the 
current majority in the population, a different race/ethnic group or from poorer countries 
outside Europe.  
Our main dependent variable (IM1) is a simple transformation of the question referring to 
the desired level of immigration of individuals belonging to the same ethnic group as the 
current majority. We re-scale the variable so that it ranges from 0 to 100, where higher 
numbers  mean  higher  support  for  immigration  (i.e.  lower  entry  restrictions).  Our  new 
variable takes 4 values: 25 (none), 50 (a few), 75 (some), and 100 (many). We note that this 
question can be interpreted as the respondent’s views on how immigration affects his or her 
individual outcomes. By leaving ethnicity considerations aside, we believe that this variable 
is better equipped to capture the economic determinants of attitudes toward immigration. 
Yet we also analyze whether our main results are robust to variations in the definition of 
our dependent variable. 
One of our main explanatory variables is a measure of the specific human capital required 
by the respondent’s job, measured as job-learning time for individuals with the appropriate 
educational  credentials.  We  note  that  this  is  a  subjective  measure  as  it  is  based  on 
respondents’ self-assessments, yet the very wording of the question is such that minimizes 
self-reporting  bias.  Specifically,  the  ESS  asks  respondents:  “If  someone  with  the  right 
                                                        
8 For more details see http://online.onetcenter.org/.   9 
education and qualifications replaced you in your job, how long would it take for them to 
learn  to  do  the  job  reasonably  well?”.  We  note  that  the  question  clearly  differentiates 
between general and job-specific human capital. The original question allows for eight 
possible answers, detailing intervals of time expressed in days, weeks, months or years. 
Based on this information we create a numerical variable expressed alternatively in days or 
months that can be used in a regression framework. We shall denote our variable by SHK 
(specific  human  capital).  SHK  has  a  mean  of  265  days  or,  equivalently,  8.8  months. 
Interestingly, the correlation with education is positive but very low (0.13). This suggests 
that the wording of the question may indeed allow us to disentangle the effect of education 
from the effect of job-specific human capital on immigration views. 
We also use a second set of variables to measure workers’ degree of protection to labor 
market competition from immigrants. Following Peri and Sparber (2009), we assume that 
natives are better at communicational or interactive (relative to manual) tasks than recent 
immigrants. As explained-above, our measures of communication and manual skills were 
constructed using the O*NET dataset. We proceeded as follows: first, we used exploratory 
factor  analysis  to  identify  our  skill  dimensions  of  interest  out  of  the  277  descriptors 
available in the dataset. Informed by this analysis, we constructed two different measures 
capturing  the  skill  dimensions  of  interest.  Measure  1  is  an  index  that  tells  us  how 
communicational-intensive a particular occupation is. For each occupation of the dataset, 
this index simply averages the scores rating the task-importance and the mean observed 
abilities of 6 different communicational skills previously identified by factor analysis as 
part of the same skill dimension. These skills are:  oral comprehension, oral expression, 
written comprehension, written expression, speech recognition, and speech clarity. Measure 
2 captures, in turn, how important physical skills are in each occupation by averaging the 
task-importance and observed ability scores of the following 7 descriptors: visualization, 
arm-hand  steadiness,  manual  dexterity,  finger  dexterity,  control  precision,  wrist-finger 
speed and visual color discrimination.    10 
These two indices are then matched to ISCO-88 occupations using the same occupational 
crosswalk employed by Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2009).
9 Further details on the 
construction and merging of O*NET scores can be found in the Appendix. In the O*NET 
dataset  the  two  indices  (manual  and  communication  intensities)  are  strongly  negatively 
correlated, with a coefficient of correlation equal to -0.54. In the ESS data the correlation 
goes  up  to  -0.78.
10  This  very  high  correlation  implies  that,  effectively,  both  variables 
contain the same information: the degree of communication-intensive relative to manual 
tasks required by each occupation. Throughout the analysis we focus on the measure of 
communication intensity. In the robustness section we will also use the index of manual 
skills. Note that, implicitly, we are assuming that the skill requirements in US occupations 
are the same as the skill requirements in the same occupations in Europe. While it would 
certainly be a stretch to make this assumption for all the occupational descriptors included 
in O*NET or if we were comparing countries with widely different levels of economic 
development, we believe it is a reasonable assumption in the context of our analysis.  
 
3.3.  Descriptive statistics 
Let us now provide a brief description of the main variables in our analysis. We start with 
the  dependent  variable:  a  measure  of  the  respondent’s  desired  level  of  immigration  of 
people of the same ethnicity as most of the population in the country (IM1). Appendix 2 
contains the exact wording of the question. Appendix 3 reports some summary statistics. 
The modal score is 75, with 46% of the sample, and a total of 68% supporting some more 
or many more immigrants of the same ethnicity. As for the rest of the sample, 25% think 
that only a few more immigrants should be admitted and about 7% of the population think 
no more immigrants should be allowed into their countries. The mean response across all 






interesting to note that there is substantial variation across countries. Table 1a presents the 
mean values for the 25 countries. For Portugal, Turkey, Greece, and the Czech Republic the 
mean ranges from 56 to 64 (roughly, allow a few immigrants to enter). At the other end of 
the spectrum, Sweden, Ukraine and Iceland are the more pro-immigrant, with mean values 
in the 80-86 range. The second column in Table 1a reports attitudes toward immigration 
that are ethnically different to the majority of the population in the destination country. 
Clearly,  pro-immigration  attitudes  are  lower  (average  score  65)  than  for  the  case  of 
immigrants with the same ethnicity as the majority of the population (average score 71). 
However, we note that the values in column 2 are approximately increasing as we move 
down the table, suggesting that the ranking of countries is practically the same for the two 
measures of attitudes toward immigration. We shall use this variable in our robustness 
section. 
Let us now turn to the main explanatory variables. To relate to earlier literature it is helpful 
to begin by reviewing the data on years of education. As shown in column 3, the mean 
across all countries is 12.7 years, but the data display a larger variation, ranging from 8.7 
(Turkey) to 14.4 (Denmark) years of education. Again we note that the values in column 3 
are generally increasing as we move down the list, even though the relationship is not very 
strong. This illustrates that the positive association between pro-immigration attitudes and 
years of schooling is not only found across individuals within a country but also across 
countries. 
Next, let us examine our measure of job-specific human capital. The mean value across all 
countries for how much time is needed for someone with the right qualifications to replace 
a worker is 8.9 months (Table 1a). Again we observe substantial cross-country variation, 
ranging from 3.9 (Portugal) to 13.2 months (France), as illustrated by Table 1a. As we 
noted earlier, our measure of job-specific human capital is only weakly correlated with 
years of education. The correlation coefficient is 0.13. 
We  now  turn  to  the  indices  of  the  communication  and  manual  skill  requirements  by 
occupation.  By  construction,  these  indices  take  values  between  zero  and  one.  Across 
countries the mean value for the communication skills index ranges from 0.36 in Turkey or 
0.38 in Poland to 0.54 in the Netherlands, with a mean value of 0.45. The manual skills   12 
index has a significantly shorter range, taking values between 0.48 (Netherlands) and 0.58 
(Poland). We also note that the top of the ranking by communication skills coincides with 
the bottom by manual skills, and vice versa. As we discuss later, the correlation coefficient 
between these two variables is very close to minus one. 
Table 1b presents descriptive statistics for all the relevant variables for our main sample of 
individual observations. In the sample, immigration attitudes (IM1) range between 25 and 
100, and years of education range from 0 to 25. Crucial to our identification strategy, there 
is  high  variation  across  individuals  in  job-specific  human  capital  (SHK),  and 
communication and manual skills. In terms of correlations, years of education is positively 
correlated  with  communication  skills  and  negatively  with  manual  skills.  In  turn,  the 
communication skills index is positively correlated with job-specific human capital but this 
correlation is weak (correlation coefficient 0.15). Manual dexterity is not correlated with 
job-specific human capital (-0.02). The Table also reports a number of individual-level 
variables  that  we  will  use  to  control  for  (observable)  individual  heterogeneity  in 
immigration views. These variables are dummy variables for the presence of children in the 
house,  for  living  in  a  rural  area,  for  having  a  foreign-born  mother,  and  a  vector  of 
individual attitudes and perceptions, including ideology, religiosity, happiness, trust, and 
social capital. 
To provide some insight into what is captured by our measures of communication and 
manual  skills,  we  next  compare  the  samples  of  individuals  currently  employed  in 
communication-intensive  occupations  (75  percentile)  to  those  in  manual-intensive 
occupations (75 percentile). We find that, on average, manual workers have 2.6 fewer years 
of education, and 77 fewer days of job-learning time. 
Furthermore,  Table  2  reports  the  top  10  occupations  ranked  by  their  average  years  of 
schooling,  average  job-specific  human  capital  (job-learning  time),  average 
communicational intensity scores and average manual intensity scores. Two features are 
worth noting. First, several of the top occupations by educational attainment are also in the 
top ranking by communicational skills. For instance, medical doctors and biologists (life 
and  health  professionals),  mathematicians  and  physicists,  or  higher-education  teaching 
professionals appear in both lists. Second, the overlap is much smaller between the top   13 
occupations by educational attainment and by job-specific human capital. In fact the latter 
contain several occupations that do not require much formal education, such as “riggers and 
cable splicers”, “wood processing and paper-making plant operators”, or “upholsterers”. 
This observation suggests that specific and general human capital (in the form of years of 
education) are indeed two separate dimensions of labor market exposure. 
 
4.  Estimation 
4.1.  Econometric model 
Our  dependent  variable  is  a  measure  of  individual  views  on  immigration.  Specifically, 
IM(i,r,c) is the response of individual i living in region r and country c to the question of 
whether immigration should increase or decrease. Our model attempts to explain individual 
variation in this variable employing several models of the form: 
   (1) 
where  the  right-hand  side  contains  country-specific  intercepts,  our  new  measures  of 
exposure (job-specific human capital and communication skill requirements in the current 
occupation),  years  of  education,  and  a  set  of  controls.
11  The  vector  of  controls  always 
includes,  age,  age  squared,  gender,  and  dummies  for  the  presence  of  children  in  the 
household, living in a rural area, and having a foreign-born mother. Occasionally, we will 
also introduce a set of additional variables aimed at capturing individual heterogeneity that 
may be relevant to understand the respondent’s views on immigration (ideology, religiosity, 
happiness, trust, and social capital).
12 For short we shall refer to this latter set of variables 
as individual attitudes. Finally, we allow the error term to be correlated across individuals 







As  argued  above,  together  with  general  skills,  job-specific  human  capital  and 
communicational skills should provide protection against labor-market competition from 
immigrants. Hence we expect the coefficient on years of education (γ) and on our two 
additional measures of labor market protection to immigration (β1 and β2) to be positive. 
 
4.2.  Endogeneity 
We are concerned with the following endogeneity problem. Individuals that particularly 
dislike immigration will search more intensively for jobs with few immigrants. These jobs 
will tend to display a high degree of protection from competition from immigrants. As a 
result, OLS estimates of our coefficients of interest (β1 and β2) are likely to be downwardly 
biased. 
Our  strategy  to  deal  with  this  endogeneity  problem  is  to  use  instrumental  variables. 
Specifically,  we  postulate  that  individuals  living  in  a  region  where  there  is  a  high 
availability of highly protected jobs are more likely to end up in one of these jobs than a 
comparable individual in a region where protected jobs are scarce. Thus we propose to use 
a measure of the regional availability of protected jobs as an instrument for the degree of 
protection in an individual’s job. In particular, we instrument an individual’s level of job 
protection by the mean protection of the average worker in his or her region of residence. 
Implicitly, our approach assumes that natives do not sort into regions (or countries) based 
on their views on immigration.
13 Similarly, and in line with the literature, we also assume 
that educational attainment is not determined by one’s views over immigration. 
Let us now examine the relevance of our instrument. Table 3 reports the results of the first-
stage regressions. We report several specifications, varying in the dependent variable. In 
column 1, the dependent variable is SHK, our measure of job-specific human capital. The 
right-hand side of the regression contains country-specific dummies, a series of controls 




the  respondent’s  region  of  origin.  Standard  errors  are  heteroskedasticy-robust  and  have 
been clustered at the region level. The point estimated of the variable of interest is 0.92, 
very precisely estimated and with a t-statistic of 47.99. In words, individuals residing in a 
region with a large availability of jobs requiring high specific human capital are more likely 
to end up in such jobs, provided that they have the right education level. 
Columns 2 and 3 report analogous regressions where the dependent variables are, in turn, 
our measures of communication skills and manual skills. As expected, the main coefficient 
is positive and highly significant in both cases. In addition, the values of the F-statistics 
imply  that  we  can  clearly  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  weak  instruments.  Columns  4 
through 6 report the first-stage regressions that correspond to our specifications including 
two  endogenous  measures  of  exposure  at  a  time.  Again,  the  results  suggest  that  our 
instruments are strong. 
Finally,  we  perform  a  robustness  test  on  the  strength  of  our  instruments.  We  drop  all 
regions with fewer than 25 observations (less than 5% of the total sample of individuals). 
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows that the first-stage estimates are virtually unchanged 
and the F-statistic associated to the null hypothesis of weak instruments remains very high. 
 
5.  Main results 
5.1.  Job-specific human capital 
We  are  interested  in  testing  the  following  hypothesis.  Individuals  employed  in  jobs 
characterized by high requirements of specific human capital hold more favorable views on 
immigration. This is because job-specific skills protect insider native workers from outside 
competition. To test this hypothesis we estimate the regression model described in equation 
(1). The dependent variable is a measure of the respondent’s pro-immigration views (IM1). 
The right-hand side of the model contains country (or region) fixed effects, the degree of 
job-specific human capital in the worker’s current job, years of education, and a number of 
controls. We cluster standard errors at the regional level.   16 
Table  4  presents  the  OLS  (columns  1-4)  and  IV  estimates  (columns  5  and  6).  As  a 
benchmark,  column  1  reports  the  OLS  estimate  of  a  regression  where  attitudes  toward 
immigration  are  solely  a  function  of  years  of  education  and  individual  controls.  As 
expected, the education coefficient is positive and quite large (1.07). We also note the 
negative coefficients on the female, children, and rural dummies, and the large and positive 
effect  of  having  a  foreign-born  mother.  The  following  columns  include  the  main 
explanatory variable, job-specific human capital. The OLS estimate is small and we cannot 
reject a value of zero (columns 2-3). Column 4 includes region fixed effects, which hardly 
affect the estimates obtained in column 3. 
Column  5  presents  our  preferred  specification  for  the  IV  estimation.  We  find  that 
individuals employed in jobs characterized by high job-specific human capital are more 
pro-immigration. The effect is quite large and statistically significant (p-value 0.053). An 
increase in four months in the time required to learn job-specific skills (conditional on 
education) has roughly the same effect on attitudes toward immigration as one additional 
year of education. In this sense, the marginal effect is three times larger for specific-human 
capital than for years of schooling. It is worth noting that the effect we have uncovered is 
distinct from the effect of educational attainment. The IV estimate of an additional year of 
education is 0.94, which is not statistically different from its OLS estimate. Finally, column 
6 presents an additional IV specification including the vector of attitudinal variables. These 
additional controls reduce by roughly 10% the effect of education but do not affect our 
estimate of the effect of job-specific human capital.  
We also note that our results suggest that OLS estimates of the effect of specific human 
capital were downwardly biased, as we had expected. Our interpretation is that individuals 
who dislike immigrants search more intensively for jobs that are highly protected from 
immigration. As a result individuals sort into jobs that, given their qualifications, require 
higher job-specific human capital. The endogeneity bias that we uncover is similar to the 
one documented by Dustmann and Preston (2001). Their results suggest that individuals 
sort spatially according to their attitudes toward minorities. 
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5.2.  Communicational skills 
Job-specific human capital provides protection toward all outsiders to the job, natives and 
immigrants alike. Here we try to be more specific and focus on a characteristic that only 
offers protection toward recent immigrants, but not toward natives or immigrants that are 
already well established and have fully assimilated. Building on Peri and Sparber (2009), 
we  assume  that  natives  have  comparative  advantage  in  communication-intensive  tasks 
relative  to  recent  immigrants.  Hence,  we  hypothesize  that  individuals  employed  in 
communication-intensive occupations will be relatively more pro-immigration. Conversely, 
individuals employed in eminently manual occupations are expected to be relative less pro-
immigration. We stress that our identification is based on comparisons across individuals 
within a country, holding education levels and other relevant demographic characteristics 
constant. 
To analyze this question we estimate the model in equation (1) but we now use measures of 
the communication skill-requirements of respondents’ current occupations. The results are 
presented in Table 5. Columns 1-4 report OLS estimates. Note that the estimate of years of 
education  ranges  between  0.61  and  0.74  after  introducing  our  index  of  communication 
intensity. This is around 30% lower than in the previous section. In turn, the point estimate 
associated  to  communication  skills  is  positive  and  significant,  with  values  around  10. 
Columns 5 and 6 present our IV estimates. As was the case for job-specific human capital 
(Table 4), IV estimates of the measure of protection are substantially higher than OLS 
estimates, with a value of 27.06 in column 5. A simple calculation shows that an increase in 
the communication skills index of one standard deviation (0.22, Table 1b) leads to a 6-point 
increase in the immigration opinion index. Column 6 shows that controlling for individual 
values and attitudes reduces further the effect of education but does not affect our estimate 
of the effect of communication skills. Finally, we also point out that years of education is 
not significant in our IV estimates. This suggests that the effect of education on attitudes 
toward immigration could stem from its correlation with communication skills. 
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5.3.  Education, job-specific human capital, and communicational skills 
As discussed in the Introduction, most previous studies have focused on a single measure of 
human capital, namely, years of education. An important feature of our analysis is that we 
have considered several dimensions of skills. In the previous sections we have found that 
both job-specific human capital and communication skills are important determinants of 
individuals’ attitudes toward immigration.  
The goal of this section is to analyze the interaction between our two new measures of 
labor-market exposure and years of education. Table 6 presents the instrumental-variables 
estimates.  As  a  benchmark,  column  1  includes  only  years  of  education  as  explanatory 
variable (in addition to the demographic controls). The point estimate on years of education 
is  1.066.  Including  job-specific  human  capital  (column  2)  reduces  the  coefficient  on 
education only slightly, suggesting that job-specific and general human capital (education) 
have differentiated effects on immigration views. The point estimate of SHK is 0.22 and 
the associated standard error is 0.12 (that is, a p-value of 0.053). As argued in the previous 
section, the effect of job-specific human capital is roughly three times larger than that of 
education, when both are measured in the same time units.
14 Column 3 adds our measure of 
communication skills. The coefficient on job-specific human capital remains practically 
unchanged (0.21) but the coefficient on years of education drops dramatically (0.23) and 
becomes  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  Column  4  adds  the  vector  of  individual 
attitudes. The effect of education drops even further (0.09) whereas the coefficient on SHK 
remains  practically  unchanged  (0.20).  Finally,  column  5  replaces  communication  skills 
with manual skills. The results confirm the message of the previous column. Naturally, the 
estimated  effect  of  manual  skills  on  pro-immigration  attitudes  is  negative  and  highly 
significant, indicating that workers employed in occupations that require high levels of 
manual  dexterity  —and  hence  where  competition  with  immigrants  is  greater—  report 
relatively more negative attitudes toward immigration. The effect of education remains low 
(and insignificant) and the point estimate for SHK increases slightly (0.23), strengthening 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient (p-value of 0.044). 
                                                        
14 Recall that SHK is measured in months whereas education is measured in years.   19 
In conclusion, the two measures of protection toward immigration that we have analyzed 
(job-specific human capital and communication skills) are both found to have significant 
and distinct effects on individual attitudes toward immigration. Our results also suggest that 
the effect of education on attitudes operates mainly through occupational attainment, since 
formal  education  allows  access  to  occupations  that  are  protected  from  labor-market 
competition with immigrants. These occupations require high communicational skills.   
 
6.  Robustness 
We now conduct some sensitivity analysis on our main results. Specifically, we make use 
of two alternative definitions of attitudes toward immigration, we re-estimate our main 
models  on  subsamples  that  differ  in  the  level  of  education,  and  we  experiment  with 
substituting the measure of communication skills by the measure of manual skills. 
Table 7 reports our findings. To provide a benchmark for comparison, column 1 displays 
the estimates from specification 3 in Table 6. Column 2 uses manual skills as a measure of 
comparative  advantage  with  respect  to  immigrants.  As  noted  previously,  the  education 
coefficient  is  drastically  reduced  when  the  regression  includes  either  manual  or 
communication  skills.  In  contrast,  the  coefficient  of  job-specific  skills  remains  largely 
unaltered. 
Columns  3 a nd  4  use  two  alternative  measures  of  the  respondent’s  views  toward 
immigration. Dependent variable IM2 is the simple average between the three questions 
available in the European Social Survey regarding the desired level of immigration. These 
questions differ on the geographic origin of the immigrants.
15 The point estimate on SHK 
falls a bit but remains significant at 10%. Column 4 uses IM3 as dependent variable. This 
variable is again an average of three questions on immigration. However, these questions 
differ from those used in IM1 and IM2 in one key aspect. The questions used in IM3 are 
much broader, and report on the respondents’ views on the effects of immigration on their 
                                                        
15 For more details, please see questions A1‐A3 in Appendix 2.   20 
country’s economy, culture, and life in general.
16 Note that this wider frame of reference 
could  make  responses  to  these  questions  less  sensitive  to  individuals’  degree  of  labor-
market exposure. That is to say, a protected worker and an exposed one could very well 
agree on the effects of immigration on the economy as a whole or on the country’s cultural 
landscape. However, attending to their economic self-interest, they may sharply disagree on 
what immigration policy to vote for. In this light it is not surprising that the estimates in 
column  4  show  that  specific  human  capital  does  not  have  a  significant  effect  on  IM3. 
Instead years of education and manual skills appear to be significant.  
The literature on comparative advantage between natives and immigrant groups focuses on 
low-education individuals (Peri and Sparber 2009, Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica 2009). 
In order to better compare our results to those studies we report estimates of our main 
model on two subsamples. The first subsample (column 6) contains only individuals with 
less than 12 years of education (57% of the population). The second subsample (column 7) 
includes only individuals with 12 or more years of education (43% of the total sample). 
Remarkably, the point estimates that we obtain are very similar in both cases and, in turn, 
very similar to our main estimates (columns 1 and 2).  
Overall, the results in this section show that that our main results are robust to the particular 
definition of comparative advantage used as well as to the heterogeneity in the effects of 
education. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper has re-examined the role of labor-market competition in the determination of 
individual  preferences  over  immigration.  A  great  deal  of  literature  has  addressed  this 
question, but has taken a very narrow view of labor market exposure to competition from 
immigrants. Our analysis has proposed a more comprehensive approach. In particular, we 
have  constructed  two  new  measures  of  exposure  based  on  job-specific  human  capital 
investments and on the importance of communication-intensive tasks. Moreover, we have 
                                                        
16 See questions B1‐B3 in appendix Appendix 2.   21 
accounted for unobserved individual heterogeneity in tastes for immigration and for the 
resulting potential endogeneity in job search. 
Overall  our  results  provide  strong  support  for  the  exposure  hypothesis:  individuals 
employed in jobs that are less exposed to competition from immigrants are relatively more 
pro-immigration. In particular, we have three main results.  
First, we build a new instrument for individual exposure to labor market competition and 
show that it is highly relevant. The instrument is based on the assumption that the types of 
jobs available in one’s regional labor market affect workers’ actual job characteristics in 
ways  that  are  unrelated  to  individual  attitudes  towards  immigration.  Second,  our 
instrumental-variables  estimates  show  that  being  employed  in  a  job  requiring  a  large 
amount of specific human capital leads to relatively more pro-immigration attitudes. The 
marginal effect of job-specific human capital on attitudes is much larger than the effect of 
formal  education.  Third,  we  show  that  being  employed  in  a  communication-intensive 
occupation also leads to more positive attitudes toward immigration. This effect is different 
from the effect of job-specialization and can by itself explain away the association between 
formal education and attitudes toward immigration. 
The latter finding provides indirect support for the endogenous job specialization theory 
postulated by Peri and Sparber (2009). According to these authors, native workers respond 
to immigration by moving to occupations where they have a comparative advantage by 
virtue of being relatively better at communication-intensive tasks. Our results suggest that 
those native workers that manage to shift to the less exposed occupations display relatively 
more pro-immigration views than those that are unable to do so. In our view, supply-side 
constraints, such as the regional availability of low-exposure jobs play an important role in 
determining individual attitudes toward immigration. In conclusion, our findings suggest a 
larger role for labor-market competition as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration 
than previously found in the literature.    22 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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1:  Descriptives 
 
1a.  Means by country.  




Comm. skills  Manual 
skills 
             
Portugal  57.69  54.93  9.36  3.89  0.45  0.51 
Greece  59.63  54.17  12.07  6.64  0.43  0.53 
Turkey  59.98  52.01  8.73  13.04  0.39  0.55 
Hungary  63.70  52.37  12.34  11.56  0.44  0.55 
Czech Republic  63.78  59.95  12.87  6.35  0.43  0.56 
Estonia  67.27  57.11  13.47  5.05  0.46  0.53 
Great Britain  67.41  63.42  12.83  11.76  0.51  0.49 
Finland  68.12  62.74  13.74  11.29  0.50  0.52 
Netherlands  68.27  65.36  13.51  10.46  0.57  0.47 
Spain  68.95  67.73  13.04  8.23  0.47  0.51 
Slovenia  69.06  66.26  12.32  12.91  0.45  0.56 
France  70.02  65.98  12.80  13.24  0.51  0.49 
Austria  70.58  65.43  12.78  6.81  0.49  0.50 
Luxemburg  70.64  63.78  13.15  9.99  0.51  0.49 
Belgium  71.80  66.43  13.53  9.86  0.50  0.51 
Germany  71.86  65.02  14.06  8.72  0.50  0.51 
Poland  73.35  70.31  12.89  8.85  0.41  0.57 
Slovakia  75.00  69.93  12.89  6.75  0.45  0.56 
Norway  75.35  70.09  13.92  9.63  0.50  0.50 
Ireland  75.47  71.18  13.40  7.91  0.48  0.51 
Switzerland  76.94  71.60  10.93  7.06  0.51  0.51 
Denmark  76.99  67.44  14.40  9.51  0.51  0.50 
Sweden  80.78  79.08  13.06  8.79  0.49  0.52 
Ukraine  85.09  72.86  13.05  7.13  0.48  0.53 
Iceland  86.01  77.87  14.10  6.91  0.49  0.51 
             
min  57.69  52.01  8.73  3.89  0.39  0.47 
mean  70.95  65.32  12.77  8.89  0.48  0.52 
median  70.58  65.98  13.04  8.79  0.49  0.51 
max  86.01  79.08  14.40  13.24  0.57  0.57 
 
Notes: Sorted from less to more pro-immigration based on the main dependent variable (IM1). SHK 
(specific-human capital) in months. See appendix for definitions of all variables.  25 
1b.  Summary main variables  
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
IM1  20121  70.87  21.23  25  100 
           
yearsedu  20619  12.84  3.58  0  25 
shk_months  16747  8.84  13.90  0.02  73 
shk_days  16747  265.12  417.14  0.50  2190 
comm  20123  0.48  0.22  0.09  0.95 
manual  20123  0.52  0.17  0.24  0.86 
           
country  20619  12.16  7.23  1  25 
region  20618  138.95  75.80  1  273 
age  20619  41.64  11.12  18  64 
female  20596  1.46  0.50  1  2 
d_children  20619  0.53  0.50  0  1 
d_rural  20619  0.37  0.48  0  1 
d_motherfb  20619  0.07  0.26  0  1 
           
ideology  20619  5.11  1.97  0  10 
religiosity  20467  4.39  2.87  0  10 
happy  20532  7.41  1.80  0  10 
trust  20609  5.20  1.96  0  10 
social capital  20619  4.92  1.48  1  7 
 
Source: ESS 2004. 
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Table 2:   The top 10 occupations according to average years of education, average 
job-specific human capital (job-learning time), average communicational intensity scores 
and average manual intensity scores. 
 
Education (in years)  Mean  Job-specific human capital (in months)  Mean 
Physicists, Chemists and related prof.  20.8  Riggers and cable splicers  73  
Medical Doctors  19.4  Photographic-products machine operators  42.6 
Biologists, botanists, zoologists & related  18.7  Farming and forestry advisers-technicians  39.6 
Higher education teaching professionals  18.4  Tobacco preparers and tobacco products makers   
38.6 
Judges  17.8  Aircraft engine mechanics and fitters  38.4 
Veterinarians  17.6  Wood processing and paper-making plant operators   
36.6 




Dentists  17.4  General managers of small enterprises  31.9 
Psychologists  17.4  Upholsterers and related workers  27.6 
Mathematicians and related professionals   
17.1 
Production and operations managers in agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing 
 
26.5 
Communicational skills   Score  Manual skills   Score 
Legislators and senior officials  0,950  Precision handicraft & printing workers  0,860 
Corporate managers  0,807  Other craft workers  0,841 
Life science & health professionals  0,760  Metal machinery workers  0,830 
Other professionals  0,759  Machine operators and assemblers  0,793 
Teaching professionals  0,715  Stationary plant operators  0,756 
General managers  0,711  Extraction and building trade workers  0,741 
Physical, math.& engineering sci. prof.  0,687  Agriculture & fishery unskilled occupations  0,708 
Other associate professionals  0,657  Physical & engineering associate profess.  0,693 
Life science & health assoc. profess.   0,638  Drivers and mobile plant operators  0,693 
Teaching associate professionals  0,560  Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  0,679 
 
 
Notes: Average years of education in occupation and average job-learning time in occupations 
calculated using ISCO-88 4-digit coding. Average communication intensity and manual intensity 
scores using ISCO-88 2-digit coding. 
 
Source: ESS 2004 and O*NET. 
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Table 3:   First-stage regressions 
 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dep. var.  SHK  COMM.  MANUAL  SKH  COMM.  MANUAL 
                    
avSHK_r  0.92***        0.92***  -0.0014**  0.0012** 
tstat  47.99        41.78  -2.44  2.73 
avCOMM_r     0.56***     -7.792***  0.58***    
tstat     19.38     -4.75  19.55    
avMANUAL_r        0.69***        0.68*** 
tstat        28.07        23.81 
                    
F stat  2303.04  375.58  787.92  895.79  191.38  283.37 
                    
Observations  16369  19632  19632  16029  16029  16029 
 
The columns below use a restricted sample: only individuals in regions with at least 25 
observations. 
Column  (1b)  (2b)  (3b) 
Dep. var.  SHK  COMM.  MANUAL 
           
avSHK_r  0.92***       
tstat  42.33       
avCOMM_r     0.55***    
tstat     18.13    
avMANUAL_r        0.69*** 
tstat        25.71 
           
F stat  1792  329  661 
           
Observations  15588  18683  18683 
 
Notes:  
- Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
- All specifications include country-specific dummies, years of education, controls for gender, age, 
age squared, as well as dummies for children, rural, and foreign-born mother. 
- The F statistic refers to the null of jointly zero coefficients.   28 
Table 4:   Job-specific human capital (SHK). 
 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
                    
yearsedu  1.066***  1.072***  0.933***  1.086***  0.943***  0.808*** 
   [0.0572]  [0.0612]  [0.0599]  [0.0579]  [0.0911]  [0.0910] 
SHK     0.0158  0.0141  0.0107  0.224*  0.221* 
      [0.0119]  [0.0117]  [0.0119]  [0.116]  [0.116] 
                    
female  -0.830***  -0.555  -0.955***  -0.637*  0.372  -0.0616 
   [0.316]  [0.351]  [0.345]  [0.353]  [0.618]  [0.595] 
age  -0.00289  -0.0700  -0.0493  -0.0593  -0.132  -0.118 
   [0.108]  [0.116]  [0.113]  [0.117]  [0.121]  [0.120] 
age2  0.000204  0.00101  0.000637  0.000870  0.00141  0.00110 
   [0.00129]  [0.00140]  [0.00138]  [0.00140]  [0.00142]  [0.00141] 
d_children  -0.0214  -0.106  -0.156  -0.0847  -0.280  -0.327 
   [0.306]  [0.327]  [0.327]  [0.332]  [0.346]  [0.346] 
d_rural  -2.168***  -2.041***  -2.236***  -1.585***  -1.967***  -2.154*** 
   [0.333]  [0.354]  [0.363]  [0.369]  [0.353]  [0.362] 
d_motherfb  2.947***  2.663***  2.818***  2.227***  2.618***  2.751*** 
   [0.686]  [0.728]  [0.733]  [0.713]  [0.712]  [0.716] 
                    
Observations  20098  16369  16232  16369  16369  16232 
R-squared  0.132  0.126  0.151  0.159  0.108  0.134 
Fixed effects  country  country  country  region  country  country 
Attitudes  no  no  yes  no  no  yes 
 
Notes:  
- Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
- Standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
- Dependent variable is IM1, the answer to the question “Do you think there should be no more 
immigration, a few more immigrants, some more immigrants, or many more immigrants?” Question 
refers to immigrants belonging to the current majority group. 
- Measures of Individual Values: Ideology, Religiosity, Happiness, Trust, and social capital.  29 
Table 5:   Communication intensity in current occupation. 
 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
                    
yearsedu  1.066***  0.714***  0.607***  0.744***  0.218  0.114 
   [0.0572]  [0.0586]  [0.0577]  [0.0543]  [0.310]  [0.306] 
comm.     11.18***  10.46***  10.68***  27.06***  26.46*** 
      [0.908]  [0.908]  [0.889]  [10.04]  [10.07] 
                    
Observations  20098  19632  19431  19632  19632  19431 
R-squared  0.132  0.141  0.165  0.170  0.122  0.145 
Fixed effects  country  country  country  region  country  country 
Attitudes  no  no  yes  no  no  yes 
 
Notes:  
- Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
- Standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
- Dependent variable is IM1, the answer to the question “Do you think there should be no more 
immigration, a few more immigrants, some more immigrants, or many more immigrants?” Question 
refers to immigrants belonging to the current majority group. 
- All specifications include country-specific fixed effects, dummies for children, rural, and foreign-
born mother. Also controls for gender, age, and age squared. 
- Measures of Attitudes: Ideology, Religiosity, Happiness, Trust, and social capital.  30 
Table 6:  Interaction between the skill determinants of attitudes toward immigration. 
 
Dep. Var: IM1  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Estimation  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 
                 
yearsedu  1.066***  0.943***  0.228  0.0962  0.174 
   [0.0570]  [0.0911]  [0.334]  [0.326]  [0.208] 
                 
SHK     0.224*  0.209*  0.203*  0.233** 
      [0.116]  [0.115]  [0.116]  [0.116] 
                 
Comm.        21.88**  22.14**    
         [9.631]  [9.506]    
                 
Manual              -38.86*** 
               [11.17] 
                 
Observations  20098  16369  16029  15897  16029 
R-squared  0.132  0.108  0.107  0.13  0.068 





- Standard errors clustered by region and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
- Standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
- Dependent variable is IM1, the answer to the question “Do you think there should be no more 
immigration, a few more immigrants, some more immigrants, or many more immigrants?” Question 
refers to immigrants belonging to the current majority group. 
- All specifications include country-specific fixed effects, dummies for children, rural, and foreign-
born mother. Also controls for gender, age, and age squared. 
- Measures of Attitudes: Ideology, Religiosity, Happiness, Trust, and social capital.   31 
Table 7:   Robustness. 
 
Column  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Estimation  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 
Dep. var.  IM1  IM1  IM2  IM3  IM1  IM1 
                    
yearsedu  0.228  0.298  0.359**  0.548***  0.000731  0.248 
   [0.334]  [0.211]  [0.166]  [0.173]  [0.175]  [0.342] 
                    
SHK  0.209*  0.239**  0.183*  0.077  0.245  0.266* 
   [0.115]  [0.114]  [0.0971]  [0.0932]  [0.157]  [0.139] 
                    
Comm.  21.88**                
   [9.631]                
                    
Manual     -38.89***  -43.36***  -44.02***  -30.47**  -50.65*** 
      [11.24]  [8.916]  [9.581]  [12.15]  [17.23] 
                    
Obs.  16029  16029  15801  15331  7858  8171 
R-squared  0.107  0.068  0.087  0.102  0.081  0.04 
 
Notes:  
(1) Baseline. IV in our preferred specification. 
(2) Manual index replaces communication intensity index. 
(3) Both manual and communication intensity indices. 
(4) Dependent variable is average of the three questions regarding the level of immigration 
preferred by the respondent (IM2). See appendix. 
(5) Dependent variable is average of the three questions regarding the general view on immigration 
(IM3). See appendix. 
(6) Baseline on subsample of individuals with less than 12 years of education (57% sample). 
(7) Baseline on subsample of individuals with more than 12 years of education (43% sample). 
 
- All estimates in the table are IV. Standard errors clustered by region and robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Standard errors in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1***  
- All specifications include country-specific fixed effects, dummies for children, rural, and foreign-
born mother. Also controls for gender, age, and age squared.   32 
Appendix 
Appendix 1.   Observations by country. 
    country |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
         AT |      1,751        5.16        5.16 
         BE |      1,305        3.85        9.01 
         CH |      1,378        4.06       13.07 
         CZ |      2,123        6.26       19.33 
         DE |      2,026        5.97       25.30 
         DK |      1,135        3.35       28.65 
         EE |      1,195        3.52       32.17 
         ES |      1,147        3.38       35.55 
         FI |      1,494        4.40       39.96 
         FR |      1,297        3.82       43.78 
         GB |      1,321        3.89       47.67 
         GR |      1,535        4.53       52.20 
         HU |      1,156        3.41       55.61 
         IE |      1,686        4.97       60.58 
         IS |        465        1.37       61.95 
         LU |        861        2.54       64.49 
         NL |      1,364        4.02       68.51 
         NO |      1,376        4.06       72.56 
         PL |      1,404        4.14       76.70 
         PT |      1,360        4.01       80.71 
         SE |      1,431        4.22       84.93 
         SI |      1,055        3.11       88.04 
         SK |      1,174        3.46       91.50 
         TR |      1,497        4.41       95.91 
         UA |      1,386        4.09      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     33,922      100.00 
Sample: Citizens age 18-64.  33 
 
Appendix 2.   Definition dependent variable. 
 
We consider three variations of our dependent variable, the respondent’s views toward 
immigration. In all cases higher values are associated to a more pro-immigration stance. 
Our main dependent variable is IM1. It is based on the following question: 
B35~    CARD 14 Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should
17 allow 
people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country’s] people to come and live here
18? 
         Allow many to come and live here  1 
      Allow some  2 
        Allow a few  3 
        Allow none  4 
        (Don’t know)  8 
We re-scale the values to range between 25 (allow none) to 100 (allow many). 
 
The second variation of our dependent variable is IM2. This variable is a simple average of 
questions B35, B36 and B37. It also ranges from 25 to 100. 
B36~  STILL CARD 14 How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most 
[country] people?  Still use this card. 




17 “Should” in the sense of ‘ought to’; not in the sense of ‘must’. 
18 “Here” = country throughout these questions.   34 
The third variation (IM3) is based on three questions regarding the respondent’s general 
view on immigration. Unlike the previous set of questions, questions B38-B40 are what 
political scientists call sociotropic, that is, they refer to the effects of immigration for the 
country as a whole and hence we believe they are less clearly related to the effects of 
immigration on the respondent’s individual labor market outcomes. As before, we take a 
simple average and re-scale the variable to take on a maximum value of 100. 
 
B38~   CARD 15 Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people 
come to live here from other countries?  Please use this card. 
 
  Bad 
for the 
economy 





00   01  02   03  04  05  06  07   08  09  10  88 
   
B39~   CARD 16 And, using this card, would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally 
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?  
  Cultural 
life is 
undermined 





00   01  02   03  04  05  06  07   08  09  10  88 
   
B40~   CARD 17 Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here 









00   01  02   03  04  05  06  07   08  09  10  88 
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Appendix 3.   Tabulation main variables 
 
APP3.1.  Dependent variable (IM1) 
 
Original question in ESS2004: 
allow many/few immigrants of | 
       same race/ethnic group as | 
                        majority |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
allow many to come and live here |      4,476       22.25       22.25 
                      allow some |      9,239       45.92       68.16 
                     allow a few |      5,015       24.92       93.09 
                      allow none |      1,391        6.91      100.00 
---------------------------------+----------------------------------- 





      imdv1 |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
         25 |      1,391        6.91        6.91 
         50 |      5,015       24.92       31.84 
         75 |      9,239       45.92       77.75 
        100 |      4,476       22.25      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     20,121      100.00 
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APP3.2.  Job-specific human capital 
 
Original question in ESS2004: 
somebody with right | 
qualification, how long to learn | 
             to do your job well |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                   1 day or less |        669        3.99        3.99 
                        2-6 days |      1,598        9.54       13.54 
                       1-4 weeks |      2,819       16.83       30.37 
                      1-3 months |      3,772       22.52       52.89 
more than 3 months, up to 1 year |      4,517       26.97       79.87 
 more than 1 year, up to 2 years |      1,993       11.90       91.77 
more than 2 years, up to 5 years |      1,063        6.35       98.11 
               more than 5 years |        316        1.89      100.00 
---------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                           Total |     16,747      100.00 
 
Our transformation (in months): 
shk_months |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
   .0166667 |        669        3.99        3.99 
   .1333333 |      1,598        9.54       13.54 
   .5833333 |      2,819       16.83       30.37 
          2 |      3,772       22.52       52.89 
        7.5 |      4,517       26.97       79.87 
      18.25 |      1,993       11.90       91.77 
   42.58333 |      1,063        6.35       98.11 
         73 |        316        1.89      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     16,747      100.0   37 
APP3.3.  Communication intensity index 
Communicational Skills by occupation 
    (O*NET) |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
        .09 |        464        2.31        2.31 
       .108 |        454        2.26        4.56 
        .12 |        128        0.64        5.20 
       .123 |         81        0.40        5.60 
       .148 |        538        2.67        8.27 
       .188 |        175        0.87        9.14 
       .207 |      1,013        5.03       14.18 
       .212 |      1,037        5.15       19.33 
       .242 |        704        3.50       22.83 
       .247 |        819        4.07       26.90 
        .26 |        916        4.55       31.45 
       .363 |      1,049        5.21       36.66 
       .469 |      1,692        8.41       45.07 
       .482 |      1,630        8.10       53.17 
        .52 |        880        4.37       57.55 
       .538 |        474        2.36       59.90 
        .56 |        283        1.41       61.31 
       .638 |        685        3.40       64.71 
       .657 |      1,768        8.79       73.50 
       .687 |        691        3.43       76.93 
       .711 |        878        4.36       81.30 
       .715 |      1,115        5.54       86.84 
       .759 |      1,086        5.40       92.23 
        .76 |        443        2.20       94.43 
       .807 |      1,067        5.30       99.74 
        .95 |         53        0.26      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     20,123      100.00   38 
APP3.4.   Manual dexterity index 
 
Manual skills by occupation 
    (O*NET) |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
       .244 |        878        4.36        4.36 
       .276 |         53        0.26        4.63 
       .328 |      1,086        5.40       10.02 
       .334 |      1,115        5.54       15.56 
       .344 |      1,768        8.79       24.35 
       .359 |        283        1.41       25.76 
       .379 |        474        2.36       28.11 
        .39 |      1,067        5.30       33.41 
       .426 |      1,630        8.10       41.51 
       .465 |        916        4.55       46.07 
       .487 |        691        3.43       49.50 
       .509 |      1,692        8.41       57.91 
       .517 |      1,049        5.21       63.12 
       .536 |        443        2.20       65.32 
       .623 |        464        2.31       67.63 
       .631 |        685        3.40       71.03 
       .679 |        704        3.50       74.53 
       .693 |      1,699        8.44       82.97 
       .708 |         81        0.40       83.38 
       .741 |      1,013        5.03       88.41 
       .756 |        175        0.87       89.28 
       .793 |        538        2.67       91.95 
        .83 |      1,037        5.15       97.11 
       .841 |        454        2.26       99.36 
        .86 |        128        0.64      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     20,123      100.00   39 
Appendix 4.   Construction indices for communication and manual 
intensities 
O*NET reports descriptors for up to 965 different occupations when occupations are coded 
at the maximum level of detail (i.e. 4-digits). Yet US occupations are much harder to match 
into the International System of Occupational Coding, ISCO-88, when they are coded in 4-
digits. Hence we use an O*NET dataset where occupations are coded at 3 digits (N= 449). 
Moreover,  crosswalks  from  the  occupational  coding  system  deployed  by  O*NET  and 
ISCO-88 have so far only been available for a 3-digit into 2-digit conversion. ISCO-88 at 
2-digits groups the 449 O*NET occupations into 26 broader occupational categories.  
For  the  construction  of  our  indices  we  proceed  as  follows:  First,  informed  by  factor 
analysis, we compute communicational intensity and manual intensity scores using the 3-
digit O*NET dataset. This procedure, which is described in detail below, assigns both a 
communicational intensity and a manual intensity score to each of the 449 occupations of 
the O*NET dataset. Secondly, using the crosswalk kindly provided by Sara De la Rica and 
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, we convert our O*NET occupations into their ISCO-88 2-digit 
equivalents. All descriptors, as well as our two measures of communication and manual 
skill intensity are converted into 2-digits by averaging the scores of all 3-digit occupations 
belonging to the same 2-digit category. Finally, we match this information to the ESS data. 
Our final skill measures are thus much less refined than it would be in principle possible, 
should we have a 3-to-3-digit converter (or even a 4-to-4). Information is undoubtedly loss 
in  the  matching  process.  For  example,  O*NET  provides  detailed  skill  descriptors  for 
“Elevator installers and repairers”, yet in order to match this US 3-digit occupation into the 
ESS,  we  need  to  average  these  skill  descriptors  with  those  of  all  other  occupations 
belonging to the same ISCO-88 2-digit equivalent, which is “Metal, machinery and related 
trade workers”. Loss of information is unavoidable giving our matching procedure.  
The  construction  of  the  skill  indices  in  O*NET  was  informed  by  exploratory  factor 
analysis. Principal-component factor analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation identified 
10 different factors out of the 277 skill descriptors in the O*NET dataset (at 3-digits). The 
first factor accounted for 25.6 of the variance. Skill-descriptors with rotated factor loadings 
higher than 0.6 in this first factor included both skills directly involved in communication   40 
(i.e.  oral  comprehension,  oral  expression,  written  comprehension,  written  expression, 
speech recognition, and speech clarity) as well as skills relating to abstract thinking (i.e. 
fluency  of  ideas,  originality,  problem  sensitivity,  deductive  and  inductive  reasoning, 
information  ordering,  category  flexibility,  memorization,  etc.).  Our  communication 
intensity measure only uses the 6 former skills, since there is no reason to suppose any 
comparative advantage of natives in the latter. The index is the result of averaging the task-
importance and the observed-ability scores of these 6 communicational skills for each of 
the 449 occupations
19 —which were later condensed into their ISCO-88 2-digit equivalents. 
Although we only focus on direct communicational skills, it must be noted that occupations 
were communicational skills are on demand tend to be those that also require abstract 
thinking.  
The fourth factor of the principal component analysis identified 7 different skills/abilities 
relating  to  physical  dexterity  (i.e.  visualization,  arm-hand  steadiness,  manual  dexterity, 
finger  dexterity,  control  precision,  wrist-finger  speed  and  visual  color  discrimination). 
These 7 skills correspond to the descriptors with rotated factor scores higher that 0.55. The 
manual  dexterity  factor  accounted  for  10.1  per  cent  of  the  skill  variance.  The  manual 
intensity index is constructed by averaging the task-importance and observed ability scores 
of these 7 skills.  
                                                        
19 For each skill involved in any given occupation, O*NET experts evaluate 2 different dimensions: 1) how 
important is this given skill/ability for the occupation and 2) the average observed levels of such skill in the 
occupation. Both dimensions correlate very highly, as can be expected. Factor analysis and hence our indices 
use both type of descriptors so for each of the skills involved in our indices we actually average 2 different 
descriptors, one referring to task-importance and the other referring to observed levels.   41 
APP4.1 The top 10 O*NET occupations (3 digits) with highest communicational-intensity 
and manual intensity scores.   
Communicational skills  Score  Manual skills  Score 
Public Relations Specialists  0.96  Electricians  0.97 
Chief executives and legislators  0.95  Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters  0.97 
Clergy  0.95  Jewelers and Precious Stone Workers  0.97 
Human Resources Managers  0.93  Structural Iron and Steel Workers  0.96 
Social and Community Service 
Managers  0.93  Engine and Other Machine Assemblers  0.95 
Speech-Language Pathologists 
 
    0.93 
  Electronic Equip. Installers & Repairers Motor Vehicles  0.95 
Advertising and Promotions Managers  0.92  Packaging and Filling Machine Operators and Tenders  0.95 




Electronic Home Entertainment Equipment Installers and 




  Electric Motor, Power Tool, and Rlated Repairers  0.94 
Sales Engineers  0.92  Tool Grinders, Filers, and Sharpeners  0.94 
 
 
 
 